Attempt
Mail impersonating your company
Sender not authenticated: SPF and DKIM checks fail.
Stopped by
DMARC p=reject – the receiving server rejects it.
Northwestern Tideline – managed cybersecurity for the age of AI: website, email, accounts, network and backups.
Illustration: typical attempts and the control that stops each one.
Attempt
Mail impersonating your company
Sender not authenticated: SPF and DKIM checks fail.
Stopped by
DMARC p=reject – the receiving server rejects it.
Attempt
Sign-in with a leaked password
Correct password, but a new device and location.
Stopped by
MFA required – no access without the second factor.
Attempt
Legacy mail sign-in
Older protocols do not ask for a second factor.
Stopped by
Legacy methods switched off; modern sign-in with MFA only.
Attempt
A known plugin flaw
The flaw is public and a fix is already released.
Stopped by
Plugin updated within the agreed window – flaw closed.
Attempt
Mass sign-in attempts
Hundreds of password attempts per hour.
Stopped by
Current firmware, MFA and attempt limits.
Attempt
Ransomware going after backups
Attackers first try to reach backups on the network.
Stopped by
A separate, immutable copy and a tested restore.
Attempt
A site on unsupported PHP
PHP 8.1 security support ended on 2025-12-31.
Stopped by
Moved to PHP 8.3 or 8.4, tested.
In recent months
Northwestern Tideline closes the door before anyone knocks.
Public figures, each with its source and date. Not forecasts, not our estimates.
Not a movie hack: four ordinary steps. Upkeep stops each one.
An employee’s password ends up in a leaked credential set, or is phished by email.
MFA on every account, no exceptions
The attacker signs in and creates a rule that hides customer replies.
Review of suspicious rules and sign-ins
A customer receives an "updated" invoice with new bank details, apparently from your address.
DMARC, so spoofed mail is rejected
The payment is made; it is noticed weeks later.
An incident plan with clear actions within 24 h
Typical scenario. Scenario generalised from publicly described Microsoft 365 campaigns and national warnings about email fraud.
Publicly reported cases from recent months.
Ransomware encrypted four systems holding patient and staff data. The regulator found no multi-factor authentication and unrestricted access.
VDAI (LT), 2026-06-26After the ransom went unpaid, ID data of more than 500 guests and staff payroll documents were made public.
LRT (LT), 2026-10-02Lithuanian travellers’ data was reported on a Russian black market; law enforcement and the data regulator were asked to investigate.
LRT (LT), 2026-10-21None of these needed an exotic exploit: an account without a second factor, an unpatched system, backups nobody had tried to restore.
Dates that apply to most companies with a website or NIS2 duties.
After this date new PHP 8.2 flaws get no fixes. Sites need to move to 8.3 or 8.4 and be tested.
php.net, 2026-10-22For companies registered as cybersecurity entities in April 2025: 24 months from registration to implement the technical measures.
NKSC (LT), 2026-10-22NIS2 entities owe an early warning within 24 hours and a notification within 72. Without a prepared plan, that is close to impossible.
LT Cyber Security Law, 2026-07-04The six ways into a typical mid-size company. We assess each, fix it and keep it current.
WordPress, WooCommerce, PrestaShop or others: core, plugins and PHP version updated within an agreed window.
The check does not end with "all fine". It ends with documents you can show your board, auditor or insurer.
Book the checkEvery gap with its risk, deadline and owner.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC: who sends in your name and how to shut out impersonation.
MFA coverage, admins, legacy sign-in methods, suspicious rules.
How long a restore took and what was missing.
Whether it applies, why, what to do and by when, with sources.
30 minutes without jargon: what matters most and what it costs to fix.
Tideline weekly summary
Company, 60 staff · 1 week
Illustration of the management report. Not client data.
Fixed scope, about two weeks. Written authorisation before any access. Output: a prioritised gap list with deadlines, labelled as an assessment.
The most important gaps closed within an agreed window: MFA, PHP and CMS updates, DMARC, backups, device firmware.
Weekly updates and checks, a monthly report for management. NIS2 evidence built continuously, not the week before an audit.
Answer for yourself. Your answers stay in your browser and are not sent anywhere.
Does every company mailbox, including admin and shared ones, require a second sign-in step?
Do you know which PHP version your website runs, and whether it is supported after 2026-12-31?
Does your domain publish a DMARC policy that rejects forged email?
In the last six months, has anyone actually restored data from a backup?
Do you know whether NIS2 applies to your company and whether you must register in KSIS?
It depends on sector and size (headcount and financial thresholds under the Lithuanian Cyber Security Law, or your country’s transposition). The check assesses it from your data, with sources.
No. Only the company head can sign in to KSIS. We prepare every piece of data and document so registration takes minutes.
Your administrator keeps things running. Northwestern Tideline keeps what runs patched, protected and proven, with deadlines, reports and NIS2 evidence.
Usually not. We work with what you have: Microsoft 365 or Google, your current website and devices. We only propose replacing what is no longer supported.
We do not publish a price list. The check has a fixed price and scope; upkeep depends on the number of systems. We reply within one business day.
Leave your website and email. A person replies within one business day with a proposed scope. We do not test your site until you give written authorisation.